Volume 15
Issue 1 International Symposium on the Salinity of the Colorado River
Winter 1975

Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of the
Colorado River
Dean E. Mann

Recommended Citation
Dean E. Mann, Politics in the United States and the Salinity Problem of the Colorado River, 15 Nat.
Resources J. 113 (1975).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol15/iss1/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SALINITY PROBLEM OF THE COLORADO RIVER*
DEAN E. MANN**

Mr. Herbert Brownell, the special negotiator appointed by President Richard Nixon to obtain an agreement with Mexico with respect to the salinity problem of the Colorado River, made the following statement at a news conference on the conclusion of that agreement:
This is a project that is based on dollars and not on water. I told the
Western States at the beginning of the negotiations that nothing
would be done, and nothing has been done as a result of this agreement, which would adversely affect the orderly development of the
Western States. There are no limitations in the agreement which
would adversely affect any of the planned programs for the development of natural resources of the basin States.1
The fundamental assumption of the negotiators was that any agreement made with Mexico would be virtually costless to those interests
in the United States having a direct stake in the decision. Those
interests are primarily irrigation farmers within and without the
Colorado River Basin who depend on Colorado River water for their
water supply.
TRADITIONAL WATER POLITICS
Mr. Brownell's statement contains the key to an understanding of
water policymaking in the United States. In most respects it is "distributive" in character and shares with some other policy issues the
following characteristics: (1) local initiation and definition of program and derived benefits; (2) settlement of conflicts through coalition-building at the local and regional levels before going to the
federal level; (3) avoidance of confrontation among competing
interests as a result of which winners and losers in the political battle
and in income consequences are disguised; (4) dependence on federal
financing; (5) logrolling for mutual benefit with other similarly
*Presented at Oaxtepec, Mexico, March 15, 1974.
**Professor of Political Science, University of California at Santa Barbara.
1. 69 Dep't State Bull. 395-96 (Sept. 24, 1974).
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situated interests who seek diverse objectives through congressional
action.2
Most irrigation was originally developed privately, but once the
best land was put into cultivation, western farming interests no
longer had the financial resources or the technical competence to
plan and construct the works necessary for irrigation. The Reclamation Act of 1902 and subsequent legislation provided the institutional and financial support for irrigation agriculture. The financial
terms of irrigation projects became increasingly more favorable with
low discount rates, longer pay-out periods and revenues from power
projects being used to make irrigation projects feasible.
The justification for national financial support for irrigation
agriculture was and continues to be found in the need for economic
development. To develop this "last frontier" federal funds were considered both desirable and necessary. The aridity of the land made
water the crucial element in fostering development so it was natural
that the settlers, promoters, and state officials would emphasize
water development as the focus of national investment. In addition,
there was a vital moral or ethical element in the justification. This
moral element emphasized the virtues of farm life, especially the
family-sized farm, and the almost religious duty to "make the desert
blossom as the rose." 3
The political mechanism by which water development projects
were authorized took on definite and unique characteristics. Local
interests, recognizing opportunities for economic advantage through
water developments patronized by the national government, stimulated political action at the local, state, and national levels through
administrative and legislative officials who were linked to those areas
and to water policy.4 The Bureau of Reclamation was recognized as
a special patron of water resource development because it had the
technical expertise to plan the projects, because its program was considered the legitimate vehicle for development projects, and because
it was looked upon by key members of Congress as their instrument
for development.
Local interests were frequently in conflict with each other, if not
2. See Lowi, American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, 26
World Pol. 677 (1964); Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics,and Choice, 32 Pub. Ad.
Rev. 298 (1972).
3. Kelso, The Water-Is-Different Syndrome or What Is Wrong With the Water Industry,
Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the American Water Works Association 177
(1967); see also J. Hirshleifer, J. De Haven & J. Milliman, Water Supply: Economics,
Technology and Policy 367 (1960).
4. Ingram, The Changing Decision Rules in the Politics of Water Development, 8 Water
Resources Bull. 1177 (1972).
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over specific allocations of water, at least over priorities for development. At the most general level, the states of the Lower Basin of the
Colorado River, especially California, were moving ahead rapidly
with water development because their population was growing more
rapidly. The Colorado River Compact was written to ensure equity
between the two basins, and to prevent California and the Lower
Basin from monopolizing the waters of the river on the basis of the
principle of prior appropriation. There was an implicit assumption
that Upper Basin development would come later as needs and opportunities were identified.
Within the basins there were also major disputes-between California and Arizona over their shares of Lower Basin water, and
among the Upper Basin states with respect to the manner in which
their share of the water of the river would be distributed. These disputes were ultimately settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Arizona v. California' for the Lower Basin
States and by the Upper Colorado River Compact 6 for the Upper
Basin States. Within the states there were also major disputes, especially between interests located within the hydrographic basin itself
and interests beyond the basin but within the states through which
the Colorado River and its tributaries flowed.'
To obtain authorization of projects it was essential to establish a
united front before national decisionmakers in the Congress. By hard
bargaining, these differences were usually resolved, thus making it
difficult for non-Western interests opposed to Western water development to capitalize on political disarray in the West itself. Once that
unity was obtained, legislative authorization was usually obtained
very easily, with the congressional committees playing the principal
role in putting the legislation in final form. By a process of "logrolling", in which legislative representatives of Western ihterests made
implicit-and sometimes explicit-trades of votes with representatives
of non-Western interests, legislative majorities were relatively easily
achieved. 8 Water resource projects, both Western and non-Western
5. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
6. 63 Stat. 31 (1949), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-34-3 (Repl. 1968).
7. These are recounted in some detail in my draft of a lengthy study of the politics of the
Upper Basin as part of the Lake Powell Research Project. The most important of these
involved the Blue River diversion for Denver; the Fryingpan-Arkansas diversion in Colorado;
the San Juan-Chama diversion in New Mexico; and currently the Bonneville Unit of the
Central Utah Project. For a briefer treatment see Mann, Conflict and Coalition: Political
Variables Underlying Water Resource Development in the Upper Colorado River Basin,
printed in this issue.
8. See, for example, the relative ease with which the Fryingpan-Arkansas, San JuanChama, Savery-Pot Hook, Bostwick Park, and Fruitland Mesa projects were authorized
during the 1960's as elements in the Colorado River Storage Project. All bills passed both
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became a kind of "currency" or medium of exchange. Because of the
strength of this system of decisionmaking, sometimes referred to as a
"subgovernment", the President and his aides seldom actively interfered to oppose water resource projects because they recognized that
they were likely to be defeated.
It is accurate and fair to say that those who paid the bulk of the
cost for these projects-the federal taxpayers-were seldom effectively represented in this process. In fact, every effort was made to
make the projects appear to be self-supporting and economically
beneficial, not only to the region but to the nation as a whole.
Because of the broadly shared view of the ethical imperatives of
development and virtue in irrigation agriculture, these efforts were
usually successful.
The most significant challenges to water resource development
along the above lines have come from conservationists or, as they are
now called, environmentalists. For the most part, they did not challenge the ethical imperatives nor did they criticize the financial arrangements. Rather, they challenged the specific intention of
promoters of projects to develop a given site that had unique natural,
aesthetic, or historic qualities. Thus, the conservationists challenged
the promoters of dams at Echo Park in the Dinosaur National Monument and above and below the Grand Canyon National Park and
Monument. And they won, after mobilizing nationwide movements
that generated sufficient adverse publicity to convince legislators that
approval of those elements of development projects would be contrary to the majority will and interest.9
In recent years, as water resource development has become more
costly, and the competition for water among its various uses more
intense, other challenges have been raised. The fiscal impact of irrigation and power project packages that have exceeded $1 billion have
caused some national decisionmakers to question the wisdom of such
investments.' 0 In effect, they challenged such public investments
because of the contribution they make to the total size of the
national budget and because they considered alternative investments
more productive of public benefit. Others tended to believe that the
income redistribution consequences often ran in the wrong direchouses by voice votes after very little struggle, once the informal state and regional conflicts
were resolved.
9. See 0. Stratton & P. Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (The Inter-University Case
Program, 1959); H. Ingram, Patterns of Politics in Water Resource Development: A Case
Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin Bill (1969); R. Nash, Wilderness
and the American Mind 161-181 (1967); E. Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics (1973).
10. For a summary statement of critical views on traditional economic analysis, see
National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future (1973).
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tions. The spokesmen for such opposition often were found in the
President's budget office, the Bureau of the Budget, now the Office
of Management and Budget.
Another significant change in the context in which the traditional
mode of political decisionmaking takes place has arisen out of international issues that concern not water policy alone but the whole
range of issues between the nations. It is clear, for example, that the
Mexican Water Treaty of 1944 was agreed to by the United States
not only on the basis of the merits with respect to the waters of the
Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers but also because of the desire on the
part of Americans to maintain and encourage friendly relations with
Mexico, especially during a time of war.' I It is not clear what the
net effects of these challenges will be in terms of the traditional way
of dealing with water resource policy in the West. The experience
with the salinity question, however, appears to confirm the traditional mode of behavior.
TRADITIONAL WATER POLITICS AND THE SALINITY PROBLEM

One of the important decisions that frames the background for
discussion of the present agreement on the salinity problem was
made as part of the legislation known as the Colorado River Basin
Project Act of 1968.' 2 In the complex process of bargaining that
involved conflicts between the basins, among states within basins,
conflicts between the Southwestern states and the Northwestern
states, conflicts between the basin states and the conservationists,
and conflicts between basin states interests and the national government, it was agreed that the supply of water guaranteed by the
Mexican Water Treaty would become an obligation of the national
government. 1 3 This provision of the legislation, in effect, relieved
the Colorado River Basin states of the obligation of supplying this
water and, at least by inference, suggested that the United States
would supply an additional quantity of water beyond that already
allocated by the Colorado River Compact.
The United States is therefore required to seek additional sources
of water to meet this obligation. The Southwest has long looked
enviously at the waters of the Columbia River in the Northwest as a
source of water since the average flow of that river is in the general
magnitude of ten times the average flow of the Colorado River. But
as part of this same bargaining process, the Department of the
11.
States
12.
13.

N. Hundley, Dividing the Waters: A Century of Controversy Between the United
and Mexico (1966).
Pub. L. No. 90-537, 82 Stat. 885 (codified in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.).
43 U.S.C. § 1512 (1971).
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Interior was forbidden even to investigate the possibility of transferring waters of the Columbia River system to the Colorado River
system for a period of ten years. Moreover, the costs and the principles which would form the basis of such transfers of water have led
some observers to doubt that such transfers would ever prove feasible
for purposes of ensuring an irrigation water supply for the Southwest.' " It may be argued, however, that the commitment made to
the Southwestern states and now to Mexico will create sufficient
incentive for the United States actively to propagate an arrangement
for an interbasin transfer of sufficient magnitude and which is attractive enough to both the Northwest and the Southwest that it
might be accomplished. If one broadens one's vision somewhat, it is
possible that such a transfer might be made politically feasible as part
of a continental water policy which would involve truly gigantic
transfers of water from Northwest Canada to various parts of Canada
and the United States.' I Thus, taxpayers from other parts :of the
United States might discover some interest in paying the costs of
such a transfer project. Still another possibility is development of
greater capability to modify the weather to increase precipitation in
the upper reaches of the Colorado River Basin. There is experimnental
and pilot project experience to indicate that sizeable amounts-in the
neighborhood of two million acre-feet-might be produced 'at reasonable cost.' 6 But local public opposition and environmental
consequences might make such projects infeasible.
A second important facet of the problem of managing the river is
the increasing recognition that the basic agreement on the Colorado
River-the Colorado River Compact-was based on faulty technical
information. The Compact negotiators appeared to believe that there
was an average annual flow considerably in excess of 15 million acrefeet. The historical evidence for such a conclusion was inadequate
and at least some of the record was based on memories of pioneers
regarding lake shoreline levels in another basin.' I A more adequate
record kept since the signing of the Compact indicates that the moving average virgin flow from 1922 to 1968 was only 13.8 mnillion
acre-feet. And more recent evidence leads to the conclusion that the
14. R. Johnson, Law of Interbasin Transfers (Nat'l Technical Information Serv. Accession No. PB 202619, 1971).
15. D. Mann, Interbasin Water Transfers: A Political and Institutional Analysis (Nat'l
Technical Information Serv. Accession No. PB 208303, 1972).
16. 1 L. Weisbecker, Technology Assessment of Winter Orographic Snowpack Augmentation in the Upper Colorado River Basin (1972).
17. P. Perkins, Scientific Information in the Decision to Dam Glen Canyon (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science,
California, February 25, 1974).
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unmodified flow of the Upper Basin is only 13 million acre-feet.'"
Virtually everyone agrees that the water resource is overextended
and that hopes for future water development-particularly for irrigation purposes-are not likely to be realized.
A third factor is the increasing strength of the environmental
movement in the United States. This movement imposes direct pressure on the Colorado River in the form of efforts to improve the
quality of its water and to ensure consideration for uses of water
other than for developmental purposes: aesthetic, recreational, and
historic. This leads directly to the salinity problem. The essential
immediate goal of such efforts is to prevent further degradation of
the quality of the river's waters, while the long-range goal is to improve its quality. As required by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972 the states must set water quality standards and establish
a plan of implementation or else the Environmental Protection
Agency will do it for them." 9 On June 13, 1974, the Environmental
Protection Agency published in the Federal Register its proposed
salinity control policy and standards procedures.2" The proposed
policy is to maintain the flow weighted average annual salinity of the
lower main stem of the Colorado River system at or below the average value found during 1972. The basin states would be required to
adopt and submit for approval to EPA by October 18, 1975 water
quality standards for salinity including numeric criteria consistent
with the above policy and a plan to achieve compliance with these
standards. The states would be required to recognize that the salinity
problem was basinwide in nature and that the goal was to achieve
compliance by July 1, 1983.
The result of extended negotiations among the states, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Bureau of Reclamation has been
an agreement on an approach to the solution of the salinity problem
and the effective adoption of the Bureau's Colorado River Water
Quality Improvement Program of 1972.21 The objective of this program was to maintain salinity concentrations at or below levels then
found in the lower main stem of the Colorado River. The problem
18. G. Jacoby & C. Stockton, Water Budget at Lake Powell and Its Relation to SurfaceWater Supply in the Upper Colorado River Basin (paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, California, February 25, 1974).
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (Supp. III, 1974).
20. 39 Fed. Reg. 20703 (1974).
21. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Proceedings of the Seventh Session
Reconvened of the Conference in the Matter of Pollution of the Interstate Waters of the
Colorado River and Its Tributaries-Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada,
Wyoming, Utah (April 26-27); Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado
River Water Quality Improvement Program (1972).
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was viewed from a basinwide perspective and the solution was
similarly conceived. The control structures contemplated in the
Bureau's study would accomplish its 405ppm reduction in the year
2000 by means of point and diffuse source control projects accounting for 100ppm and costing $150 to $200 million; irrigation and
water management improvements programs would account for a
reduction of 60ppm and would cost $240 to $300 million. The
remaining 245ppm reduction would come from vegetation management and channelization, desalination, and weather modification at
undetermined costs. Construction activities, assuming a time frame
of 1972 through 1981 would cost between $400 and $500
million. 2 2 As stated by an economist who reviewed the program,
"Investments, economic sanctions, standards and rules, educational
programs, legislation and other institutional arrangements would be
extensive and complex." 2 3
A fourth condition which affects the decisions with respect to
management of the Colorado River is the changing character of the
economy in the Colorado River Basin. The energy crisis is perhaps
the most notable evidence of the changing economy, with increasing
interest being shown in the construction of coal-fired steam plants,
coal gasification, and the development of oil shale. Each of these uses
requires large quantities of water either for cooling or for processing.
It is estimated that, by 1985-1990, 155,000 acre-feet of water will be
required per year to produce one million barrels of crude oil daily
from oil shale. 2" A National Academy of Sciences report indicates
that strip mining and strip mining reclamation of land do not require
large quantities of water but that water required for conversion of
coal to oil by liquefaction or to pipeline gas would require a great
deal of water: 65,000 acre-feet of water per year to produce 100,000
barrels per day of synthetic crude oil and 20,000 to 30,000 acre-feet
of water per year in a plant producing 250 million standard cubic
feet per year of synthetic gas.2 ' Water used for those purposes will
either foreclose future irrigation developments or require transfer of
water rights from a "lower" economic use to a "higher" economic
use. And utilization of water for those purposes will presumably add
a pollution burden to the river unless controls are carefully contrived
and supervised to prevent a further reduction in quality. Myron
22. Id., at 31, 45.
23. B. Gardner & C. Stewart, Agriculture and Salinity Problems in the Colorado River
Basin 25 (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, February 28, 1974).
24. Colorado River Association [California] Newsletter, January/February, 1974, at 2.
25. National Academy of Sciences, Rehabilitation Potential of Western Coal Lands 9,
101 (1974).
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Holburt of California's Colorado River Board estimates an addition
of 3 ppm salinity increase for each 100,000 acre-feet of water
diverted for oil shale production.2 6
POLITICAL RESPONSE TO MINUTE 242 AND TO EPA PRESSURE
The agreement arrived at by Herbert Brownwell for the United
States and the negotiators for Mexico was not well received by
spokesmen for the interests in the Southwestern states. Ival Goslin,
the Executive Director of the Upper Colorado River Commission,
charged that Brownell ignored "the most pertinent and important
points of advice of the Committee of 14 representing the seven Colorado River Basin States." 2 " He asserted that the Department of
State, in supporting legislation authorizing the works called for by
the agreement, was attempting to give away the water assets of the
Colorado River Basin and millions of dollars of the nation's money in
immediate capital costs and perpetual operation and maintenance
obligations. He further asserted that the agreement constituted a
major alteration of a treaty and therefore should be considered by
the U.S. Senate. He claimed:
It incorporates ground water which is not covered in the original
treaty. It changes, at least for an indefinite period, the amount of
water to be delivered to Mexico, and would cause the Secretary of
the Interior to violate the reservoir operating criteria of the Colorado
River Basin Project Act of 1968. It gives a water quality (salinity)
guarantee to Mexico which was specifically omitted from the Treaty,
and for all practical purposes precluded by the inclusion of the
language saying that the water to be delivered to Mexico shall be
made up of the waters of said river, whatever their origin. 28
The Basin States concluded that the following steps had to be
taken to prevent damage to their interests:2 9
1.Simultaneous authorization of the salinity control program
and the works specifically required for Mexico.
2. Prompt construction of the works under the agreement in
order to avoid delivery of 118,000 acre-feet/year over and above
that required by the Mexican Water Treaty.
3. Assumption by the United States of the obligation to replace
43,000 acre-feet annually lost as reject water from the desalination
plant.
26.
27.
annual
28.
29.

Newsletter, supra note 24, at 2.
I. Goslin, Outline History of Colorado River Development 50 (paper presented at the
meeting of the American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science, February 28, 1974).
Id., at 52.
Id, at 52-53.
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4. Additional power provided for the desalination plant and not
taken from existing Southwest power users.

5. Protection of U.S. groundwater resources near the Mexican
border.
6. Confirmation by the Nixon Administration that the Agreement would not impair the rights of the Basin states to continue to
utilize their water rights in accordance with the "Law of the River."
The Nixon Administration recommended implementation of the
proposals contained in the agreement but opposed inclusion of the
salinity control program recommended by the seven basin states,
EPA, and the Bureau of Reclamation in its legislative recommendation. For their part, the representatives in Congress from the Southwestern states introduced legislation which incorporated both projects to implement the agreement with Mexico and projects to carry
out the domestic salinity control program. 3 0 Goslin asserted in early
1974 that "Whether the Administration's Bill can be supported by
the Colorado River Basin States will probably depend to a large
extent upon the measures the Federal government is willing to take
to protect interests within those States." 3 1
Thus, the stage was set for another battle involving the waters of
the Colorado River. But there were powerful incentives operating on
all of the parties which would lead to agreement. The United States
was obviously anxious to come to an agreement with Mexico, not
only on the issues of equity that are raised by the specific salinity
question on the Colorado River, but on general grounds of comity
among nations. As Weinberg states, "That the United States has been
willing to go this far amounts to a recognition, however reluctant and
however costly, that there is a strong national interest in resolving
this dispute by agreement rather than by some form of arbitration or
international judicial action."'3 2
Within the United States, however, there were powerful interests
that had to be accommodated. The traditional mode of accommodation was to guarantee, by some financial device, that no interests
within the United States would suffer any negative effects as a result
of a particular agreement. The only negative effects would be imposed on the general taxpayers who would have no effective voice in
30. Southwestern representatives in 1973 introduced salinity control legislation along the
lines of the EPA-BuRec-Southwestern States agreement. S. 1807, H.R. 7774, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973). The 1974 House bill was H.R. 12165, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
31. Goslin, supra note 27, at 52-53.
32. E. Weinberg, "Salt Talks" United States and Mexico Style: A Case Study of the
Lower Colorado River Salinity Dispute 45, May 23, 1972 (draft of a case study to appear in
a publication of the American Society of International Law tentatively entitled International Responsibility for Environmental Quality).
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the proceedings. To some extent the Office of Management and
Budget, the chief budgetary agency for the President, might be expected to consider their welfare but that office naturally accedes to
presidential determination that some accommodation must be made.
The results of the bargaining between the Administration and the
Southwestern interests were therefore fairly predictable: approval in
general outline of the Administration's program as incorporated in
Minute 242 and the Southwestern states' program for salinity control
projects and programs along the main stem and tributaries of the
Colorado River." The key to this agreement was the unity of the
Southwestern states. Perhaps for the first time since 1922, the states
of the basin discovered a mutuality of interest that allowed them to
present a united front to the Congress. Wesley Steiner, State Water
Engineer of Arizona and Chairman of the Committee of Fourteen,
testified for the Southwestern states and represented the collective
views of these states. The traditional conflicts of interest between
California and Arizona and between the Lower and Upper Basin
states were suppressed under the urgent necessity of meeting imminent water quality standards required by U.S. law and the Mexican
Water Treaty.
At the outset of the 1974 hearings, the Administration opposed
the salinity control program features of the legislation on the
grounds that such projects were premature because the EPA and the
states had not yet reached agreement on water quality standards
because there were no feasibility studies completed for the projects
and because of uncertainty with respect to financing arrangements
for the projects. On the latter point, the Administration noted that
the 75 percent federal obligation of the proposed legislation was
based on the financing arrangements for municipal waste treatment
plants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972 and that no consideration had been given to the applicability
of that formula to salinity control projects.' ' Finally, since the
Administration preferred only the program for dealing with the Mexican Water Treaty problem, it preferred the Secretary of State to be
the responsible official in meeting the Treaty obligations.
Administration eagerness to obtain its Mexican Water Treaty projects-and it was clear that the United States was not obligated to
carry out many key features of the Minute 242 until those features
33. Pub. L. No. 93-320, 88 Stat. 266 (1974).
34. Letter from Russel E. Train, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
to Hon. James A. Haley, Chairman, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, March
11, 1974, in Hearings on H.R. 12165 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Water &
Power Resources of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.

57-59 (1974).
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were authorized for appropriation-made it amenable to inclusion of
the salinity control features in the legislation. The legislation passed
both houses of Congress with almost lightning speed-at least for
Congress-and became law with President Nixon's signature on June
26, 1974. The principal features of that legislation were the following:
1. Construction of a 129 million gallon per day desalting complex
for treatment of the heavily saline draw-water from the WelltonMohawk Project, plus additional features such as pumping plants and
extension of a bypass drain; the desalting plant would reduce the
dissolved solids in the feed water 90 per cent; all costs would be
nonreimbursable.
2. Acceleration of a program to improve irrigation efficiency in
the Wellton-Mohawk Project, with the District bearing a portion of
the cost.
3. Acquisition by the Secretary of the Interior of an initial
10,000 acres of the 75,000 acres in the Project for the purpose of
reducing returned flows; reduction in repayment obligation and an
offset for any increased operating costs.
4. Acquisition of additional lands above Painted Rock Dam for
temporary flood storage.
5. Construction of a new canal or lining of the Coachella Canal
for a length of 45 miles for the purposes of conserving water presently lost to seepage; cost of this construction to be repaid by the
Coachella Valley County Water District in 40 years, except that the
payment period would not begin until the Central Arizona Project
becomes operative.
6. Construction and operation by the Secretary of the Interior of
a well-field near the Mexican border, the water to be delivered to
Mexico under the Treaty obligation; the cost of the well-field is
nonreimbursable.
7. Authorization to construct four salinity control projects as an
initial stage in the overall salinity control program. They are (1)
Paradox Valley, Colorado; (2) The Grand Valley Basin, Colorado;
(3) Crystal Geyser, Utah; and (4) Las Vegas Wash, Nevada.
8. Authorization of investigation of 13 other identified sources of
salinity, including irrigation, point and diffuse source controls; reports to be sent to the states for comment and thereafter to the
President, Congress and other federal agencies.
9. Creation of a Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Advisory
Council composed of no more than three representatives of each
state for purposes of advising on the salinity control program.
10. Seventy-five percent of the costs of each project to be nonreimbursable in view of the federal responsibility for an interstate
stream and for international comity with Mexico, and because of
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federal ownership of most of the lands from which the dissolved
solids originate; 25 percent of the costs to be borne by the Upper
Colorado River Basin Fund and the Lower Colorado River Development Fund, with allocation on the basis of several criteria.
11. Authorization to increase power rates charged under contracts administered by the Secretary of the Interior under the Colorado River Storage Project Act for purposes of paying the allocated
costs of the salinity control projects.
12. Authorization of expenditures of $155 million for the construction of the works in support of the Mexican agreement; authorization of $125 million for the construction of the salinity control
projects above Hoover Dam.

It should be noted that the environmentalists took almost no part
in the discussion of this legislation. Only the Environmental Policy
Center and the Sierra Club provided token opposition in the House
Interior Committee hearings. They urged consideration of alternatives such as shutting down entirely the Wellton-Mohawk project and
reducing irrigation usage in the Upper Basin. 3 s There was almost no
discussion of the financial features of the legislation except for
Administration opposition to the salinity control program until more
study had been given to the matter. 3 6 As indicated above, that
opposition was easily overcome.
Thus, important policy decisions have been made for dealing with
the salinity problem of the Colorado River. These policy decisions
deal with such fundamental issues as the level of development assumed for the basin, whether to emphasize structural or nonstructural approaches to the solution of the salinity problem, and responsibilities of the various levels of government and associated interests
for the accomplishment of water quality goals.
Bureau of Reclamation studies are based on full development of
authorized projects and it is clear that both Upper and Lower Basin
interests are anxious to ensure full development, assuming that cor35. Hearings, supra note 34, at 306-312. On the question of shutting down the WeltonMohawk project, the testimony seems to be conflicting with respect to costs. Herbert
BrowneU testified that that alternative had been explored and that he was convinced that
the dollar costs, in addition to political and social costs, would have equalled or exceeded
the dollar costs of the program he recommended. See id., at 85. On the other hand, Rafael
Moses, Counsel to Colorado Water Conservation Board, reported to the Upper Colorado
River Commission, "We could have bought up the Wellton-Mohawk project and retired the
whole thing for a lot less than this is going to cost but politically, of course, it is not
feasible." Upper Colorado River Commission Official Record for meeting of September 17,
1973, at 142.
36. Congressman Craig Hosmer questioned the formula for dividing Upper and Lower
Basin responsibility for financing the 25% of the costs not assumed by the Federal Government. With the Lower Basin contributing 85% of the total, he expressed concern that that
formula might provide the basis for financing future basinwide projects. Committee of 14
and Upper Basin representatives assured him it did not. Hearings, supra note 34, at 216-218.
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rective measures will be taken to deal with increased salinity caused
by full development. The Office of Management of Budget, however,
has required reexamination of all authorized but yet unconstructed
projects to determine their impact on the salinity problem. As outlined by Ival Goslin of the Upper Colorado River Commission, further irrigation development is hampered by the attacks of environmentalists on projects and by federal agency policies, including the
Department of the Interior policy to downgrade water development
programs relative to other programs, adoption of the Water Resources Council principles and standards and discount rates that
make projects less economically feasible, and studies such as that
emanating from the National Water Commission."
Whether presently authorized projects will be fully developed and new ones
authorized remains to be seen, and much will depend on both the
water quality standards finally adopted and demands for water in
industries other than irrigation.
The initial emphasis in salinity control appears to emphasize structural approaches rather strongly. Desalination, point and diffuse
source control projects, and lining of canals all have received attention in the salinity control legislation. Rejected have been nonstructural approaches such as alterations in the plans for present and
future development, or elimination of such major contributors to the
salinity problem as the Wellton-Mohawk project. By its failure to
impose serious financial burdens on the beneficiaries of salinity control measures and by failure to consider other options in the form of
subsidies to reduce water use or changes in the pricing system, Congress has not created important incentives to alter practices or to
change water uses to reduce the salinity problem.'
Either not considered or rejected were such innovations of an economic-institutional character as a water rights purchase program, 3 9 a cost-sharing
formula that would have local interests pay a substantial share of the
salinity control program, 4" or an institutional arrangement that
would stress state, regional or river-basin responsibility for salinity
control.4 1 The Bureau of Reclamation, in its 1974 report on the
37. Upper Colorado River Commission, supra note 35, passim.
38. See, e.g., Martin, Economic Magnitudes and Economic Alternatives in Lower Basin
Use of Colorado River Water, printed in this issue.
39. Howe & Orr, Economic Incentives for Salinity Reduction and Water Conservation in
the Colorado River Basin, in Salinity in Water Resources 120 (J. Flack & C. Howe eds.
1974) (Proceedings of the 15th Annual Western Resources Conference, Boulder, Colorado).
40. Marshall, Cost-Sharing and Efficiency in Salinity Control, in Flack & Howe, supra
note 38, at 139.
41. Freeman, Impacts of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 on Water
Quality Management, in Flack & Howe, supra note 38, at 160.
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salinity control program, indicates that improved irrigation efficiencies and water systems management are the most promising nearterm measures for salinity control.4 2 These require no major structural features but rather training costs for personnel, and education
of the irrigator. Whether these programs will be adequately carried
out or will be effective without economic incentives remains to be
seen.
Finally, it is clear that the salinity control program will be largely
a federal program carried out by the Bureau of Reclamation, largely
financed by the federal taxpayer, and monitored by federal agencies
such as the Environmental Protection Agency. State involvement and
influence will be ensured by means of advisory mechanisms such as
the Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Advisory Council composed of representatives of all of the Colorado River Basin states and
designed to provide liaison between federal agencies and the states
with respect to the salinity problem, and the Colorado River Basin
Salinity Control Forum to work with the EPA in the development
and adoption of numeric criteria by October 18, 1975. Federal involvement is imperative given the basinwide, interstate nature of the
problem. But other options with respect to financial, administrative
and technical options were not seriously explored.
Thus, to return to the theme of this paper, traditional water politics appears to be leading to solutions congruent with the output of
previous water politics, i.e., formation of a strong local or regional
coalition by a process of bargaining and accommodation, leadership
provided by federal bureaus, an ability to find a basis for bargaining
with other interests-in this case, the national Administration-and
an avoidance of issues that might make clear the winner and losers in
the political battle. The achievement of unity within the entire basin
has made the salinity control coalition a powerful one indeed. It has
been successful thus far in achieving an approach to the solution of
the salinity problem that promises extensive benefits to traditional
beneficiaries of such an approach with very little cost.
One might agree with the National Academy of Sciences in their
view that water management on the Colorado River should reflect
comprehensive assessments of alternatives and explicit recognition of
trade-offs in the uses to which the river's water is put and the investments that make those investments possible. 4 But the existing political arrangements and practices-based on complex constitutional,
legal, administrative, and financial arrangements-make such analysis
42. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Colorado River Water Quality
Improvement Program, Status Report, 1-3 (Jan. 1974).
43. National Academy of Science, Water and Choice in the Colorado Basin (1968).
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difficult. The consequence is planning by bargaining and decisions
that are made possible because there is little or no sacrifice by any
important interest within the region. Thus, intraregional trade-offs of
costs and benefits are ignored while the general taxpayer pays the
bill. Unfortunately, at the national level there is seldom a careful
assessment of whether paying that bill compares favorably with paying other bills that might realize greater national welfare in return for
the investment.

